The Effect of the Characteristics of Board of Directors on Real Earnings Management

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate professor, Alzahra Universit, Tehran, Iran (corresponding author)

2 Master of Accounting, Islamic Azad University ,Faculty of Economics and Accounting,Central Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effect of the characteristics of board of directors (Chief Executive Officer Duality, CEO tenure duration, size and independence of the board of directors) on earnings management. In this study, data from 62 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years of 2011 to 2015 were used. The statistical method used in this research
is panel data and the multiple linear regression models were used to test the hypotheses. In this study, three models of real earnings management (real earnings management based on abnormal cash flows, real earnings management based on abnormal discretionary expenditure and real earnings management based on abnormal production costs) were considered. The results of the hypotheses test using panel data showed that from the four characteristics taken into consideration for the board of directors, duration of tenure of Chief Executive Officer on the board of directors (in all three models of real earnings management), the size of the board of directors (in real earnings management model based on abnormal discretionary expenditure ), the independence of the board of directors and CEO-duality (in real earnings management models based on abnormal production costs), have a significant impact on the real earnings management
 

Keywords

References

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International Journal of Finance & Managerial Accounting
Volume 2, Issue 6
August 2017
Pages 57-69

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