Investigating the Effect of Managerial Entrenchment on Bias Overconfidence in Companies Listed in Tehran Stock Exchange

Document Type : Original Article


1 Department of Accounting, Qeshm Branch, Islamic Azad University, Qeshm, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Department of Accounting, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran

3 Assistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Qeshm Branch, Islamic Azad University, Qeshm, Iran

4 Associate Professor of Accounting, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran


Tenured And Possessive Behavioral words are in the area of financial theories that is in line with the theory of representation, it seeks to narrow the gap of interest between shareholders and investors and guide the company's decisions to maximize shareholder interest, it seeks to narrow the gap of interest between shareholders and investors and guide the company's decisions to maximize shareholder interest. The purpose of this research is the effect of managerial entrenchment of bias overconfidence in companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this study, 111 Tehran Stock Exchange companies were studied in the period of 2013 to 2017. In this research, in order to measure the managerial entrenchment three criteria were used CEO tenure; Managerial ownership and DUAL And bias overconfidence were measured by two criteria overconfidence-excess capacity and excess debt capacity investment. The results showed a significant positive effect managerial entrenchment On Both overconfidence measure of excess capacity and excess debt capacity investment.


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